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Constitutional Cases 2004:
An Overview
Patrick J. Monahan* and Evan Van Dyk**
This volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consists of
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School’s 8th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference held on April 15, 2005, examines the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the
calendar year 2004.1 The Court handed down a total of 78 judgments in
2004,2 19 (or 24 per cent) of which were constitutional cases.3 As in
previous years, the majority (17 out of 19) of the constitutional
*
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1
A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada,” as defined in s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 19942004, available online at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/HTML/cat4_e.asp>.
3
The 19 constitutional decisions handed down in calendar year 2004 were as follows:
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 657 [hereinafter “Auton”]; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 [hereinafter “Canadian
Foundation”]; Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine
(Village), [2004] S.C.J. No. 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 [hereinafter “Lafontaine”]; Haida Nation v.
British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [hereinafter
“Haida”]; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [hereinafter “Harper”]; Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J.
No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 [hereinafter “Hodge”]; Martineau v. Canada (Minister of National
Revenue-M.N.R.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 58, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 737 [hereinafter “Martineau”]; Gilles E.
Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, [2004] S.C.J. No. 50,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 95 [hereinafter “Néron”]; Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and
Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees (N.A.P.E.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
381 [hereinafter “NAPE”]; R. v. Demers, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489 [hereinafter
“Demers”]; R. v. Fontaine, [2004] S.C.J. No. 23, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 702 [hereinafter “Fontaine”]; R.
v. Lyttle, [2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193 [hereinafter “Lyttle”]; R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J.
No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 [hereinafter “Mann”]; R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3
S.C.R. 432 [hereinafter “Tessling”]; Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004]
S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 [hereinafter “S. 83.28 Application”]; Vancouver Sun (Re),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 [hereinafter “Vancouver Sun”]; Reference re Same-Sex
Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 [hereinafter “Same-Sex Marriage Reference”];
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 [hereinafter “Syndicat
Northcrest”]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [hereinafter “Taku River”].
**
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decisions were Charter cases. Two of these Charter cases also dealt with
federalism issues,4 while a further two cases dealt with Aboriginal
rights.

I. CHARTER CASES
The McLachlin Court continues to be receptive to Charter claims,
though less so in 2004 than in 2003, with seven out of 17 (or 41 per
cent) of the Charter claims heard succeeding. Since McLachlin J. became Chief Justice on January 7, 2000, 39 out of a total 79 (49 per cent)
Charter claims have succeeded. While demonstrating a small decline
from 2003, this still represents a marked increase from the success rate
of 24 per cent (31 out of 90 cases) seen between 1996 and 1999, and the
32 per cent success rate (86 out of 264 cases) seen in the 1991-1995
period.
1. Equality Rights 20th Anniversary
With April 17, 2005 marking the 20th anniversary of the coming into force of section 15 of the Charter, three articles in the volume look
back at the development of equality jurisprudence over this period. Each
author offers a different perspective on this jurisprudence: Peter Hogg5
is critical of the Court’s development of the test for a violation of
equality rights; Donna Greschner6 notes the strength of Canadian jurisprudence in this area, particularly in contrast with the American experience; and Judy Rebick7 places herself between Hogg and Greschner in
tracing both the positive and negative political effects of section 15 over
the past 20 years.

4
Federalism issues were considered in Demers (Criminal Code provisions dealing with
accused found unfit to stand trial upheld under federal Criminal law power) and the Same-Sex
Marriage Reference (federal provision stating that officials of religious groups may refuse to
perform marriages not in accordance with their religious beliefs found ultra vires as encroaching on
provincial power over solemnization of marriage under s. 92(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867).
These federalism issues are not considered in any detail by the essays in this volume.
5
“What is Equality? The Winding Course of Judicial Interpretation” (2005), of this volume, at 39.
6
“Praise and Promises” (2005), of this volume, at 63.
7
“The Political Impact of the Charter” (2005), of this volume, at 85.
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Hogg views the Law8 test for violations of equality rights as a wholly negative development. Three particular criticisms that have been
made of the “human dignity” criterion are offered: it is vague, offering
very little substance as a test; it confuses the distinction between section
15 and section 1 by introducing an evaluative judgment at the preliminary stage; and it increases the burden on claimants by raising the
threshold to be met before the government is forced to defend its legislation. Pointing out that the “contextual factor” of correspondence — an
inquiry into legitimacy of purpose and reasonableness of action — has
come to be the dominant factor in section 15 cases and that section 1 has
been used only once to justify legislation since the advent of the Law
test, Hogg argues that the Court should move back towards an Andrewslike9 approach, which would show greater respect for the boundary
between the two provisions.
Donna Greschner offers 15 points about the section 15 jurisprudence and, in doing so, provides a positive assessment of its development. For Greschner the Canadian judiciary’s treatment of gay and
lesbian rights, its rejection of originalism, its embrace of lessons from
international jurisprudence and its application of a progressive interpretation of the Constitution (all in contrast to American developments) are
reasons for celebration. However, Greschner questions how far the
Court will be able to go in improving positive liberty in areas such as
poverty reduction. In agreement with Hogg, Greschner recognizes the
problems with the Law test, and suggests that it might be improved by
developing different criteria for different types of discrimination. Finally, Greschner wonders about the inability or unwillingness of women’s
groups to rely on section 28 of the Charter, particularly in the NAPE
case this year.
Judy Rebick examines the Charter’s effects from a political perspective. Whatever the legal impact, Rebick argues, section 15’s political
impact has been undeniably positive and is witnessed in the mobilization of women, disabled people, visible minorities and Aboriginals into
a unique coalition. Again using the American experience as a reference
point, Rebick notes the strength of the women’s movement in Canada
through the 1980s and 1990s. Like Greschner, Rebick also questions
8
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
9
Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
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why section 28 has not been used by women’s groups and asks why the
Charter has not done more for visible minorities over the past 20 years.
2. Equality Rights
With judgments in Canadian Foundation, Hodge, Auton, NAPE and
the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, the Supreme Court’s section 15
docket was characteristically busy in 2004. In our view, the Court also
made significant progress in 2004 in clarifying or simplifying equality
rights analysis. For example, in Hodge the Court makes it clear that
section 15 analysis must involve a comparison between the claimants
and a relevant comparator group; moreover, the Court clarifies that the
selection of a comparator group is ultimately a question of law for the
courts. Thus, although the claimants can and should suggest a relevant
comparator group, this suggestion cannot be determinative. In Hodge a
former common law spouse had sought to compare herself to married
separated spouses for purposes of claiming CPP survivor benefits. The
Court found that the relevant comparator group is actually divorced
spouses, a group that was not entitled to CPP benefits. Thus there was
no denial of a benefit and no discrimination for purposes of section 15.
We regard this clarification as both helpful and important.
The Auton case is also significant because it clarifies that denial of
equal treatment must operate “by law”; moreover, in determining
whether this requirement has been satisfied it is important and essential
to have regard to the precise terms of the statutory scheme in question.
The section 15 claim advanced in this case was premised on the belief
that the scheme guaranteed everyone funding for all “medically necessary” services. The Court found that this premise was incorrect, since
the scheme was designed to fund “core services” only. The Court also
noted that the proper comparator group in this case was to those persons
seeking funding for therapy that was “emergent and only recently becoming recognized”. Taking this comparator group into account, there
was no evidence that the B.C. government had been any less receptive
to the claim for autism therapy funding than for other comparable
claims.
The Court’s analysis in these cases is clear, well reasoned and unanimous. The vague concept of “human dignity”, which had been rightly
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criticized since its emergence in the Law case10 as failing to provide any
determinacy to equality rights analysis, plays a secondary role in the
analysis. The Court seems to be clearing away the confusion that has
plagued its equality rights analysis over much of the past decade, which
we regard as very encouraging.
Essays in this volume focus in particular on Auton, NAPE and the
Same-Sex Marriage Reference,11 key section 15 decisions in the latter
half of 2004. Papers by Geoffrey Cowper, and by Christopher Manfredi
and Antonia Maioni focus on Auton, which reversed lower court decisions concluding that autistic children are constitutionally entitled to
costly health care services. In discussing the communitarian themes that
can be found in this year’s section 15 jurisprudence, Roslyn Levine and
Jonathan Penney provide broader reflections on the evolution of section
15. Elsewhere in this volume, Jamie Cameron adds to the commentary
on NAPE; further analysis of the Same-Sex Marriage Reference is provided by Jamie Cameron and Bruce Ryder.
Geoffrey Cowper12 argues that the Auton decision reflects a trend in
the Supreme Court of deciding equality claims which challenge social
programs on narrow legal grounds, rather than on broader principles of
social policy. He questions the impact of the factual record in cases
where it conflicts with deeply held social views. Cowper’s analysis
leads him to state that while the Court allows governments to balance
societal and individual interests, this balancing act cannot be used to
justify irrational and arbitrary distinctions under section 15.
With reference again to Auton, Christopher P. Manfredi and Antonia
Maioni13 examine litigation’s potential as an instrument of health policy
reform. Two basic claims have recently been made: the first argues that
there is little evidence that litigation has been a useful tool of social
policy reform; the second claims that even without direct positive
effects, rights litigation can have important long-term political effects by
10

Id., note 8.
Though it is discussed by Roslyn Levine and Jonathan Penney, Canadian Foundation
was decided early in 2004 and was addressed by last year’s conference. See P. Burstein, “What’s
the Harm in Having a ‘Harm Principle’ Enshrined in Section 7 of the Charter?” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 160; R. Levine, “In Harm’s Way: The Limits to Legislating Criminal Law”, id., at 195; and J.
Benedet, “Hierarchies of Harm in Canadian Criminal Law: The Marijuana Trilogy and the Forcible
‘Correction’ of Children”, id., at 217.
12
“Equality Rights and Social Benefit Programs” (2005), of this volume, at 93.
13
“Reversal of Fortune: Litigating Health Care Reform in Auton v. British Columbia”
(2005), of this volume, at 111.
11
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empowering marginalized groups. Manfredi and Maioni use the Auton
decision to show that the results in such cases have been mixed. While
Auton mobilized groups around the country and spawned widespread
litigation and high levels of public support, the cases, in the end (with
the Supreme Court ruling) have changed no legal rules. The authors
warn that using litigation as a tool of health care policy reform results in
sophisticated queue-jumping by prioritizing certain treatments, reducing
complex policy issues to two-party disputes and, when litigation is successful, imposing national solutions on local problems.
Although the tradition in Canadian equality jurisprudence has been
to view the rights protected by section 15 as individual rights and leave
the concept of communitarian standards to section 1, Roslyn Levine and
Jonathon Penney14 demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s equality rights
decisions in 2004 have applied communitarian concerns — previously
seen only in dissenting opinions — at the section 15 stage of the analysis. The shift away from the subjective element of human dignity analysis, the Court’s substitution of the comparator group in Hodge and the
linking of the denial of the right to the provision in the Newfoundland
pay equity case reflect this shift away from a preoccupation with individualistic conceptions of equality rights.
3. Freedom of Religion
The Charter’s guarantee of religious freedom has been quiet in recent years but was brought to the forefront in 2004 with two decisions
from Quebec: Lafontaine and Syndicat Northcrest. Meanwhile, gay
marriage engaged section 15 and section 2(a) at the same time and challenged the Supreme Court, in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, to
consider whether there are conflicts between the two guarantees. Bruce
Ryder’s paper on religious neutrality is followed by Richard Moon’s
discussion of Syndicat Northcrest, and David Brown provides a comment on both papers.
Starting from the point of view that religion and conscience are important positive goods, Bruce Ryder15 argues that while the Charter

14

“The Evolving Approach to Section 15(1): Diminished Rights or Bolder Communities?”
(2005), of this volume, at 137.
15
“State Neutrality and Freedom of Conscience and Religion” (2005), of this volume, at
169.
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imposes a duty of religious neutrality on the state, this duty requires the
state to be neutral as between religions and not to be neutral about religion. In fact, in Lafontaine, Ryder argues, the Court might have seized
the opportunity to place on governments a positive obligation to foster
religious activity, so long as such assistance is extended equally to all
religious groups. In discussing the Same-Sex Marriage Reference, Ryder
notes that the state cannot refuse to take a position on policy issues
which have a religious dimension; rather, its obligation is to determine
the validity of state laws based on constitutional norms rather than on
religious doctrine (a test by which the common law definition of marriage fails). Finally, Ryder predicts that the majority judgment in
Syndicat Northcrest may open the door to an expansive interpretation of
freedom of conscience in the future, though the Court’s apparent division on religious issues suggests that these matters will be debated again
in the coming years.
In criticizing the Court’s ruling in Syndicat Northcrest, Richard
Moon16 highlights the tension between two competing points of view:
one is that both religious and non-religious beliefs and practices are a
matter of individual autonomy protected by a single freedom (“freedom
of conscience and religion”); the other is that religious beliefs and practices merit an additional level of protection over non-religious beliefs
due to their way of connecting the individual to a community and identity. Moon argues that the majority’s favouring of the second principle
privileges religious beliefs over secular beliefs when these come into
conflict with the larger public interest. The Court’s attempt to balance
both of these competing principles (Moon suggests that to take sides
may in any case be impossible), is reflected in tensions over the scope of
the freedom, the nature of the wrong addressed by the freedom, the
place of religion in public debate and the character of public secularism.
David Brown17 builds his comment on the framework of the tensions
identified by Moon. He rejects the suggestion that the Court’s ruling in
Syndicat Northcrest has privileged religious beliefs over non-religious
matters of conscience. In particular, he argues that with the lack of jurisprudence on freedom of conscience, it is difficult to predict how the

16

“Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005), of this
volume, at 201.
17
“Neutrality or Privilege? A Comment on Religious Freedom” (2005), of this volume, at
221.
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Court might treat these matters. Brown claims that it was necessary to
protect non-mandatory religious practices in order to reflect the reality
of religions as practised by their adherents. Finally, he rejects the idea
that there is a dichotomy between protecting religious beliefs as freely
and individually chosen, and protecting them as cultural characteristics.
Since protection under both of these justifications can be found in section 2(a) and section 15 of the Charter, the challenge is to develop a
jurisprudence of limitation that allows the Court to balance sensitivity
toward conscientious conviction with the ability of the community to
place reasonable limits on religious beliefs.
4. Freedom of Expression
Harper v. Canada was one of the Supreme Court’s most significant
decisions under section 2(b) in recent years. There, a majority held that
Parliament’s third party spending limits, which apply during federal
election campaigns, are a justifiable restriction on freedom of expression. This section of the conference publication includes three papers on
this issue, by Colin Feasby, Christopher Bredt and Richard Haigh. Their
contributions are followed by Mark Freiman’s discussion of Néron v.
C.B.C. and the law of defamation. It should also be noted that the Court
decided a third significant case on freedom of expression, in the context
of the open court principle; its decision in Vancouver Sun arose under
Parliament’s Anti-terrorism Act and is discussed by David Paciocco’s
paper on the Charter and the criminal law.
In examining the Harper decision, the three commentators concluded that the Supreme Court’s Charter analysis of third party election
spending limits is plagued by shortcomings. Colin Feasby18 argues that
the Court’s failure to recognize the potential for politicians to abuse
election rules led it to take an approach that was overly deferential.
While the Court accepted the government’s stated objective of levelling
the playing field in election campaigns, a more rigorous and sceptical
inquiry of the government’s objective would have enabled the Court to
investigate whether election finance legislation is in fact aimed at maintaining the political status quo, thereby curtailing the agenda-setting

18

“Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process” (2005), of this volume, at 237.
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function of issue-advocacy groups and shielding politicians from criticism. Feasby also agrees that while the nature of the election campaign
may require special rules, the Court in Harper extended its deference to
legislation affecting expression outside of the campaign, an area in
which such deference cannot be justified.
Along the same lines, Christopher Bredt and Laura Pottie19 agree
that a healthy dose of judicial scepticism is particularly warranted for
regulations that restrict advocacy in the electoral context. They cite a
tendency for Parliament to enact legislation that preserves the status
quo, and argue that there is a clear need to keep this tendency toward
“self-interested regulation” in check. By posing a number of examples,
they also point to the flaws of the egalitarian model, which was adopted
by the majority opinion in Harper.
Richard Haigh20 argues that the Court has not probed the nature of
political advertising, as compared with commercial advertising. The
question of election financing is one part of a larger problem of fair
elections, rooted in unequal access to the media, the narrowing of political debate and the influence of wealth in politics. In fact, Haigh questions whether, in this era of more subtly applied political tactics
favouring wealthy parties, election spending limits can do anything
more than pacify voters, reassuring them of the surface fairness of the
electoral system. In embracing a deferential approach to Parliament,
however, the Court may have foreclosed the opportunity to examine
these issues in greater depth in the future.
Examining another aspect of freedom of expression, Mark Freiman21
argues that the Court’s decision in the defamation case of Néron v. CBC
sets a new low-water mark for the protection of expression which, although applying directly only in Quebec, might have important implications in the common law provinces as well. By applying a test of
professional journalistic standards that is incapable of providing a
framework for balancing the public interest with the private interest of
the plaintiff, the Court has contradicted the balancing act required by

19
“Liberty, Equality and Deference: A Comment on Colin Feasby’s ‘Freedom of Expression and the Law of the Democratic Process’ ” (2005), of this volume, at 291.
20
“He Hath a Heart for Harping: Stephen Harper and Election Spending in a Spendthrift
Age” (2005), of this volume, at 305
21
“The Public Law Consequences of Private Disputes: Néron v. CBC and the Law of Defamation” (2005), of this volume, at 321.
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Hill v. Church of Scientology22 when imposing limits on expressive
freedom. The Court’s use of “wrongful pruning” as a concept in examining the truth of a media broadcast might also have important implications for the common law defences of truth and fair comment in
defamation cases.
5. Legal Rights
Alan Young comments on the Supreme Court’s key decisions on the
Charter’s legal rights in 2004 which, apart from Canadian Foundation,
were Mann and Tessling. In addition, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Anti-terrorism Act’s investigative hearing; though the
Court upheld the provision in Section 83.28 Application, it strongly
endorsed the open court principle in Vancouver Sun. Despite that endorsement, David Paciocco’s paper expresses concerns about the increase in government secrecy that has been provoked by terrorism. Scott
Hutchison comments on both papers.
Citing several recent appeal court decisions correcting clear-cut section 8 violations, Alan Young23 asks why this provision has seemingly
had so little effect on the practice of policing. According to Young, the
Supreme Court’s two recent decisions in this area give little hope that
this will change. By setting out vague standards for the use of new surveillance technology in Tessling, and by approving searches in the context of investigative detention in Mann, but refusing to outline limits on
this new police power, Young argues that the Court has failed to provide
clear guidance to the police. By not establishing clear limits these decisions make it difficult for the police, who are obligated to respect the
rights of Canadians under section 8 of the Charter, as well impair any
“dialogue” between the Courts and Parliament in determining the scope
of police powers in relation to search and seizure rights.
David Paciocco24 outlines recent developments in the area of the
“open court” principle by examining how the government and the legal
community have responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. The best way to ensure a proper balance between the interests of
openness and security is to maintain a healthy commitment to appropri22
23
24

Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.
“Search and Seizure in 2004 — Dialogue or Dead-End?” (2005), of this volume, at 351.
“When Open Courts Meet Closed Government” (2005), of this volume, at 385.

Constitutional Cases 2004: An Overview

11

ate norms among those responsible for defining and administering these
laws. However, recent provisions, including amendments to section 38
of the Canada Evidence Act, and sections 83 and 486 of the Criminal
Code, cause Paciocco to doubt whether this commitment is deep
enough. Nonetheless, he finds some cause for hope in the Supreme
Court’s strong defence of open courts in Vancouver Sun (Re).
Scott Hutchison’s25 comment suggests that the Court’s decision in
Tessling has struck an appropriate balance between the individual’s
interest in privacy and society’s interest in law enforcement. Rather than
simply erect barriers to investigation, the Court has applied a purposive
approach in interpreting section 8. Hutchison also notes that search and
seizure law has become far too complex to be effectively followed by
police and that more clarity and coherence will enhance respect for the
Constitution by police and other state actors. Finally, in response to
Paciocco, Hutchison agrees that institutional culture is essential in protecting openness of the courts; however, he observes that it may be more
realistic to develop a culture of openness in routine policing than in a
national security context, an arena in which the stakes are unavoidably
raised.

II. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
The Court examined Aboriginal rights in two important cases in
2004 in the Haida Nation and Taku River decisions, both written by
McLachlin C.J.C. for a unanimous Court. In these cases, the Court outlined the extent of the Crown’s obligation to consult with Aboriginal
groups before authorizing activities in cases where the existence of
Aboriginal rights has not yet been established. Brian Slattery and Ria
Tzimas examine how these cases fit into the broader development of
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, while Kent McNeil looks at whether
provincial governments even have the authority to infringe on Aboriginal lands, thereby undercutting the duty to consult outlined by the Court.
Brian Slattery26 argues that the Haida Nation and Taku River decisions are an affirmation of the principle of the honour of the Crown

25
“Knowledge is Power: The Criminal Law, Openness and Privacy” (2005), of this volume, at 419.
26
“Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005), of this volume, at 433.
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outlined in section 35 interpretation since the Sparrow27 case. This principle points simultaneously to a need for both litigation and negotiation.
Litigation can be used by native groups to demonstrate the existence of
historical rights, but under the Haida Nation paradigm, negotiation
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples can create new, modern
iterations of generic rights, resulting in a generative and dynamic role
for section 35 in which the Crown has an ongoing duty to identify Aboriginal rights in a contemporary form.
Kent McNeil’s28 article questions the legitimacy of the “duty to consult” placed on the British Columbia government. Through an examination of the powers vested in provincial governments by the Constitution
and the Indian Act,29 McNeil demonstrates that the authority of the B.C.
government to infringe on the lands in question — a logical prerequisite
of the duty to consult — may not exist. Since Aboriginal title has not yet
been demonstrated over the lands in question, the British Columbia
government may in the future have the authority it seeks, but in the
meantime, any government action would later be open to a claim of
wrongful intrusion.
Rather than viewing the Haida Nation and Taku River decisions as
representing a major change on questions of jurisdiction, Ria Tzimas30
argues that the Court’s decisions fit into a broader context of reconciliation, which can be traced to the Quebec Secession Reference.31 However, Tzimas questions the possibility of achieving reconciliation through
the prescribed course of negotiation, the ability of the parties (not only
governments and Aboriginal groups but other interested parties) to find
common ground and the potential for helpful interim agreements to be
created while parties negotiate towards ultimate reconciliation.

27

R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
“Aboriginal Rights, Resource Development, and the Source of the Provincial Duty to
Consult in Haida Nation and Taku River” (2005), of this volume, at 447.
29
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
30
“Haida Nation and Taku River: A Commentary on Aboriginal Consultation and Reconciliation” (2005), of this volume, at 461.
31
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
28
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III. KEYNOTE ADDRESS
In his contribution, Michael Ignatieff32 urges academics not to be silent in the face of our current political crisis, one which will have a
profound impact on national unity. Canadian federalism, due to the
diverse character of our country, is a continual process of selfjustification and self-invention, in which academics must take responsibility for leadership in constantly re-articulating what Canada stands for.
Only by improving federalism, particularly through re-thinking our
current models of fiscal federalism, can we face the challenge of separatism.

IV. CONCLUSION
The 2004 year saw a number of important developments in Charter
and Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. Yet 2004 was also a year of significant change for the Court, with Iacobucci and Arbour JJ., both of whom
had emerged as key figures on the Court in recent years, retiring in June
2004. Indeed, a core group of Chief Justice McLachlin and Iacobucci,
Arbour and Fish JJ. were key to the majorities in a number of contested
5-4 decisions in early 2004. With Abella and Charron JJ. joining the
Court in late 2004, four of nine justices have been members for three
years or less and, barring unexpected early retirements, the relatively
youthful Court is entering a period where we can expect stability in its
membership.33 It will therefore be important in 2005 and beyond to
assess whether the recently reconstituted Supreme Court attempts to
shift the Court’s constitutional analysis in new or different directions.

32

“Keynote Address: Law and Politics in the Canadian Constitutional Tradition” (2005),
of this volume, at 29.
33
Apart from Major J., who will retire in December 2005, no other retirements from the
Court are scheduled until 2013.

